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Chapter 5
Privacy, Trust and Incentives in Participatory
Sensing
Mehdi Riahi, Rameez Rahman, and Karl Aberer
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we study the socioeconomic issues that can arise in distributed com-
puting environments such as distributed and open, participatory sensing systems.
Due to the decentralized nature of such systems, they present many challenges,
some of which are equally socioeconomic and technical in essence. Three such
major challenges arise in participatory sensing, one economic and two social.
The economic problem is centered around the provision of incentives. How can
participants be provided with incentives to ensure that they contribute to the system;
that they provide sensed data when requested; and take part in various sensing
activities?
The social problems are related to issues of Trust and Privacy. Trust issues
revolve around determining which participants send accurate and truthful data and
consequently which participants could be deemed more reliable. Privacy issues
revolve around the fact that participants by taking an active part in sensing
campaigns, risk exposing private details about themselves, such as their location
at particular points in time.
In practice all three challenges are interlinked. For example, in order to ensure
participants privacy, a system could provide anonymization of the users’ identity.
However, given that every node/participant is anonymized, it becomes harder to
put in place an effective trust mechanism, which requires the identification of both
trustworthy nodes and malicious/unreliable ones. In the same vein, system designers
can use incentive schemes to incentivize users to sacrifice their privacy so that an
efficient trust mechanism could be put in place.
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In the rest of this chapter, we examine various approaches that have been utilized
in participatory sensing projects for ensuring privacy, setting up trust mechanisms,
and providing incentives. Finally, we end with a discussion that highlights the major
research areas that need to be examined in more detail. We note that participatory
sensing systems are related to citizen science and urban informatics, and the
problems we study in this Chapter are also relevant for those fields. Therefore, our
discussion here would also benefit researchers working in those fields.
5.2 Privacy
5.2.1 The Challenge of Privacy
In participatory sensing systems, data is collected and shared by the participants to
satisfy the goal of the system, be it community awareness, community services, or
understanding social or environmental phenomena. Inevitably, the collected mea-
surements directly or indirectly reveal some information about the participants and
their environment. If the provided data can be used to infer additional information
about the participants than what they actually intend to reveal, their privacy is
threatened.
Privacy protection can be concurrently enforced in different phases of a partici-
patory sensing system. On the sensing devices, the users should be able to choose
when, where, and with what granularity to perform sensing and reporting. Local
privacy protection measures such as location obfuscation or data perturbation can
be employed by the mobile nodes. On the server side, privacy protection measures
such as anonymization, secure and privacy-aware storage could be put into place.
Privacy-aware data storage, processing, and visualization are crucial for imple-
menting a complete privacy-preserving participatory sensing system. Access con-
trol, usage monitoring, and data management tools should also be provided to the
participants to have a fine-grained control on who accesses what data, for how
long and with which granularity. In this section we don’t cover these topics in
detail; a thorough review of these requirements can be found in Christin et al.
(2011). Here we outline the most important privacy requirements in participatory
sensing and review the privacy protection mechanisms that have been proposed in
the community.
Even though individuals have different perception of privacy, it is critical to the
widespread adoption and success of participatory sensing to educate the participants
about the privacy implication of their participation and to develop countermeasures
against possible privacy threats. Ideally, participants should be able to understand
the amount of privacy protection or privacy leakage in a tangible way. They should
also be provided with the tools to tune the level of their protection based on their
personal preferences and the incentives they receive for contributing data. Location
and context privacy protection are major privacy challenges that must be addressed
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to ensure privacy protection of the participants and hence the sustainability of
participatory sensing systems.
In most participatory sensing applications, reports from participants have to be
tagged with the location of the measurement and the time at which the measurement
has been taken. However, location is private information for many people and
when it is combined with time, sensitive information about habits, trajectories and
relations of participants can be inferred. As stated in Johnson et al. (2007) one of
the privacy challenges in participatory sensing is that participants have concerns
about their context being revealed or inferred by others. For example, based on the
reported data, others can discover that the participant is awake, sleeping, jogging,
shopping, or in a conversation. Moreover, even social context of the participants
might be inferred through the reported data. For example, if several participants
attending a (private) meeting in a hotel report data, the data receiver can easily infer
that they are in that hotel and in the same meeting.
Assigning sensing tasks to participants can be a threat to their privacy. For
example, if user ui is assigned a task to report temperature at location l and ui
performs the task at time t, then the creator of the task will know that user ui has
been at location l at time t. Therefore it is essential to protect privacy of participants
while tasking by employing an anonymous tasking mechanism.
Including the identity of the user who reports data values in the reports is a clear
way to disclose private information such as locations or trajectories. In order to make
it difficult for an adversary to link data reports to the reporter, the reports must be
anonymized. However, anonymization per se is not a strong measure against privacy
attacks as long as the attacker can link several data reports from the same user or
can analyze the reports to infer information about the user who has performed the
sensing (Shin et al. 2011).
Privacy threats concern not only data providers, but also data consumers. Private
information about the users who issue sensing tasks can also be inferred by
adversaries. Consider a user ui who regularly creates sensing tasks, requesting
measurements of a phenomenon at a specific location l. It is easy to conclude that
l is a point of interest for ui. If the identity of ui is known, discovering her point of
interests can be a potential privacy threat. Even if the identity of ui is not known a
priori, with the help of some background knowledge it is possible to find her identity.
Therefore, queriers’ privacy is another challenge of participatory sensing that has
to be addressed.
5.2.2 Privacy Protection Mechanisms
In this section we categorize the privacy protection mechanisms proposed in the
literature that try to address some of the issues outlined above and give a short
overview of each approach.
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5.2.2.1 Privacy-Preserving Tasking
A solution proposed for privacy-preserving tasking is task beaconing (Johnson et al.
2007). In this approach, tasks are periodically broadcast to the users. The users
who are interested in performing a task, inform the system without identifying
themselves. The drawback of this approach is that no guarantees can be provided
either for task completion or the quality of the results. Another proposed approach
is called attribute-based tasking (Johnson et al. 2007). In this approach users
who possess a particular set of attributes can identify themselves to the system
without revealing their identities. For example, users can use cryptographic-based
credentials to prove that they belong to a certain group. For instance, a user could
belong to a group of users who have certain sensing modalities or have specific
sensing qualities. Data integrity and quality assurance of data reports cannot be
ensured in this approach due to the lack of knowledge about the identity of the
users.
In AnonySense (Cornelius et al. 2008; Shin et al. 2011), privacy-preserving
tasking is achieved as follows: a sensing task is created by an application and sent
to the ‘Registration Authority’ (RA). RA checks the validity of the task for privacy
safeness and forwards it to the Task Service (TS). The users pull the tasks from
the TS through an anonymization network such as Tor (Dingledine et al. 2004). By
using Tor, the identity and location (IP address) of users are protected when they
connect to the TS. The TS verifies the tasks acceptance conditions to prevent too
restrictive conditions that are vulnerable to what the authors call narrow tasking
attacks. In narrow tasking attack, a malicious application tries to find the identity
of the reporters by creating tasks with too restrictive acceptance conditions. The
adversary knows that the number of users who can accept such tasks is small and
consequently can discover their identity. Further, by having the users to pull tasks
from the TS, what the authors call the selective tasking attack can also be prevented.
In selective tasking attack, the adversary, who has control over TS, tries to distribute
the tasks to only a few users so that their reports can be easily linked.
In certain participatory sensing campaigns, the participants query the server
for data collection points (DCs), the locations for which data is required. Users
generally wish to provide data for locations which are close(r) to them. However,
in order to do this, users have to reveal their exact locations, and a malicious
server can infer the identity of the users based on their locations, using additional
background knowledge. This process is called location-based attack. To resolve
this problem, a solution based on P2P spatial k-anonymity has been proposed
(Kazemi and Shahabi 2011). Each user identifies its Voronoi cell in a distributed
manner by communicating with other users. Then using multi-hop routing, each
user finds at least k  1 other users in the neighborhood and identifies the cloaked
area. However, simply sending the cloaked area along with the range query to the
server does not guarantee privacy protection of the users. This is due to a special
property of such participatory sensing campaigns called all-inclusivity, where all the
participants query for their closeby locations. This property can help the malicious
server to de-anonymize the users. In order to alleviate this problem, only a subset of
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representative queries are submitted to the server. The query results are then shared
among all the users. In this approach, it is assumed that users trust each other not to
reveal sensitive information about their peers.
5.2.2.2 Privacy-Preserving Reporting
As countermeasures against finding the identity of the reporter by linking data
reports, several approaches have been proposed in the literature which fall into two
classes: anonymous reporting and location blurring.
Anonymous Reporting
AnonySense prevents identification of the origin of the reports and the identity of
the reporter by providing a mix network (MIX) for the users to send their reports
to the Report Server (RS) (Cornelius et al. 2008; Shin et al. 2011). MIX acts as an
anonymizing channel by routing reports through multiple servers, mixing similar
reports from different sources and to different destinations, and inserting delays.
A technique called spatial obfuscation for privacy-preserving sensor selection
has been proposed (Krause et al. 2008). In this approach, instead of selecting and
contacting individual sensors, the space is divided into a set of cells and instead
of individual sensors, cells are selected. Then in the selected cell, a sensor is
(randomly) selected by a trusted arbitrator. Thus, the selected sensor can report its
exact location and data without revealing its identity.
In order to alleviate the need of the trusted third party and for protecting
location privacy and ownership privacy (i.e., associating reports to users) of the
users, an algorithm called HP3 has been proposed, which takes advantage of the
social network that is formed by the participants (Hu and Shahabi 2010). Instead
of uploading the report directly to the server, the user randomly chooses one
of its friends and sends the report to her, which in turn forwards the report to
another friend. The data is encrypted in order to prevent the intermediate nodes
from exploiting the contents. To avoid data corruption, the data is segmented and
redundantly sent through different routes.
In all these approaches privacy protection is achieved at the cost of more
communication overhead.
Location Blurring
In order to prevent identifying the exact location of users from their reported data,
the location should be blurred or should not be easily distinguishable from the
location of other users. This technique is also called spatial cloaking and in general
is achieved by generalization or perturbation of the location. In generalization, a
value with higher granularity is reported instead of the actual value. In perturbation
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techniques, the value is replaced by a different value, e.g., by the result of a function
applied to a group of values. To protect the privacy of users ‘k-anonymity concept’
is widely used (Sweeney 2002). k-anonymity is based on the idea that from the
perspective of an external observer, individuals in a group of k entities which share a
common attribute are not distinguishable if the group is known only by that common
attribute.
Even though k-anonymity can prevent identity disclosure, it is shown that
it cannot prevent attribute disclosure (Machanavajjhala et al. 2007). Attribute
disclosure refers to the case where confidential information about an individual
is obtained from the semantic meaning of an attribute. Background knowledge
attack and homogeneity attack are two known attacks that can lead to attribute
disclosure (Machanavajjhala et al. 2007). l-diversity is an approach that is proposed
to ameliorate privacy preservation of users (Machanavajjhala et al. 2007). The basic
idea behind l-diversity is that each group of users (or reports) contains at least l
well-represented values for the sensitive attributes. In the simplest case, we can say
that values are well-represented if they are distinct.
In AnonySense (Kapadia et al. 2008; Shin et al. 2011) the geographical area
is divided into large enough tiles to provide k-anonymity for the users. Instead
of reporting their location, users report the tile in which they are located. This
generalization technique is called tessellation. Each user knows in which tile she
is located, since she can consult a pre-built tessellation map of the area. Therefore,
users need not reveal their location to find out in which tile they are located.
Microaggregation technique (Domingo-Ferrer and Mateo-Sanz 2002) for anony-
mous location reporting is proposed in Huang et al. (2010). Microaggregation is
a perturbation scheme in which users are divided into ‘Equivalent classes’ (ECs)
and the mean of the EC represents the perturbed location of the users that form
that EC. An EC is created based on the Euclidean distance between location of
users and it also conforms to k-anonymity. That is, the number of users in each
EC is at least k. The heuristic that is used for creating ECs is called Variable
size Maximum Distance to Average Vector (VMDAV). The authors show that both
tessellation and microaggregation have mutual advantages and propose a hybrid
approach called hybrid VMDAV to combine these advantages. To overcome the
shortcomings of k-anonymity, the authors employ l-diversity and propose LD-
VMDAV, an improvement on VMDAV based on l-diversity.
In addition to the cloak size k in k-anonymity, it has been argued that the size of
the cloaked region and the distance of the cloaks to each other are important for the
privacy of users (Shokri et al. 2010). The impact of the cloak size and k, the size
of the anonymity set, on the quality of the information has also been investigated
(Rodhe et al. 2012). It has been shown that data quality is more influenced by the
cloak size as compared to the size of the anonymity set.
Using cloud-based agents for mobile nodes and a quadtree which is maintained
in a distributed fashion, has been proposed (Krontiris and Dimitriou 2013). The
stationary agents that reside in a cloud represent mobile nodes and collaborate with
each other to support location privacy without needing any third party entity that can
threaten the privacy of the users. Mobile nodes send their updated locations to their
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agents. An agent obfuscates the location of its mobile node by choosing a region
in the quadtree which best corresponds to the desired obfuscation level. The querier
consults the quadtree to find the agents in the regions that overlap the queried region.
5.2.2.3 Data Perturbation
The key idea behind privacy protection through data perturbation is to add enough
and appropriate noise to the data so that the data cannot be reconstructed. However,
it has been shown that just adding random noise to each data item does not render
reconstruction impossible because of the correlation among different data reports or
between data and the context (Ganti et al. 2008). On the other hand, data which is
largely perturbed is not useful for the applications. PoolView (Ganti et al. 2008)
is a participatory sensing architecture with no trusted third party component in
which users can locally perturb their data with application-specific noise so that data
items cannot be reconstructed accurately, but the aggregate value can be computed
correctly. In this approach, a priori knowledge about the characteristics of the
phenomenon is required and only statistical trends about the phenomenon, such
as average and standard deviation, can be reconstructed from the perturbed data
reported by the participants. The noise model that is selected has to be similar to the
actual phenomenon model and the distribution of the noise is a common knowledge
in the community.
Another, similar idea has also been proposed for reconstruction of multidimen-
sional data maps in vehicular participatory sensing (Pham et al. 2010). The proposed
algorithm can correctly reconstruct the joint density from the perturbed data and
the known noise density. This approach is shown to be effective against filtering
attack, range attack and leak attack, but it is vulnerable against map-based attack.
In filtering attack, the adversary uses filtering techniques to remove the additive
noise from individual data. When the boundaries of the real data values and noise
are finite, it is possible to find out the actual data value. This case is called range
attack. In leak attack, the adversary might be able to estimate the seed of the pseudo
random number generator and try to reconstruct the noise values given the noise
distribution. In map-based attack, the adversary might be able to combine the real
map with an estimation technique to infer the most likely trajectory.
5.2.2.4 Location Hiding and Adding Dummy Locations
In this type of privacy protection, the user does not accept sensing tasks when
she is in sensitive locations. Alternatively, a user accepts tasks in long enough
intervals in order to make trajectory inference more difficult. For example, in
sparse querying, the queries to each user are imposed sparsely and infrequently
(Krause et al. 2008). However, this approach cannot guarantee a high level of
privacy protection if the adversary has access to enough background information
about the participants. A selective hiding approach is employed in PEIR (Personal
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Environmental Impact Report) (Mun et al. 2009). Users can select their sensitive
locations and the algorithm creates alternative traces that are realistic but do not
contain the sensitive locations. These candidate traces are further modified by time
shifting and adjusting the duration of the activities so that the output is still similar to
the actual output for the applications. Works like You et al. (2007), Lu et al. (2008),
and Kido et al. (2005) propose to report locations from dummy trajectories which
look like realistic trajectories and are also close to the real trajectories of mobile
users in order to make location and trajectory inference difficult for the adversaries.
5.2.2.5 Data Aggregation
Providing aggregated data by the community to the participatory sensing system can
protect the privacy of the participants. If anonymization is performed appropriately,
the adversary cannot tell apart the individual contribution of participants in the
aggregated report. However, in many cases, aggregated data does not satisfy the
purpose of the system.
Anonygator is a distributed anonymous data aggregation service which leverages
P2P aggregation (Puttaswamy et al. 2010). Each user contributes data in the from of
a histogram, which is aggregated with other histograms contributed by other users in
a privacy preserving manner. Anonymity is achieved through an anonymous routing
scheme. Distributed aggregation is performed by using a tree-based aggregation
construct which is called multi-tree.
The concepts of data slicing and mixing are used in Shi et al. (2010) to support
statistical additive and non-additive aggregation functions. For additive aggregation
functions, the key idea is that each node slices its data into n C 1 slices. Then, it
randomly chooses n nodes, called its cover nodes, from its neighborhood and sends
each slice to one of them. Each node sends to the aggregation server (AS) the sum
of its left slice and the slices received form other nodes. In this way, the aggregation
server cannot find out the individual data and its origin. Non-additive aggregation
functions, such as Max/Min, Median, Histogram, and Percentile are supported by
enabling the possibility of answering count queries in a privacy preserving manner.
The basic idea is that the AS asks queries to the nodes which have “yes” (1) or
“no” (0) answers. The sum of the “yes” answers is reported to the AS as outlined
for additive aggregation functions. Similar to binary search, adapted queries are
successively asked until the desired answer is found. This approach can protect
privacy of the users unless when all other users and the AS conspire. However,
intermediate nodes can make inferences about their neighbors or the whole network.
In addition, the authenticity of the data cannot be guaranteed as the intermediate
nodes can modify the slices they have received from other nodes.
The work in Erfani et al. (2013) tries to mitigate the shortcomings of the approach
in Shi et al. (2010). The aggregator and the mobile nodes are assumed to be
untrusted. Nodes can act maliciously by trying to infer measurements from their
neighbors or by manipulating the aggregated data. The idea is based on additive
homomorphic encryption used in secret perturbation (Castelluccia et al. 2005), and
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data splitting (He et al. 2007). The scheme work as follows: when a node sni receives
a query, it generates a random key eKi and encodes its measurement Di using that key
and sends it directly to the AS. The random key is then transmitted to the AS via n
randomly chosen cover nodes as eKi D PnjD1 Qki;j, using the random slicing technique.
The AS can check the integrity of the data using the proposed secure homomorphic
MAC.
5.2.2.6 Encrypted Data Reporting
PEPSI (Privacy-Enhanced Participatory Sensing Infrastructure) is a privacy preserv-
ing data reporting and querying approach based on Identity-Based encryption (De
Cristofaro and Soriente 2011). The key idea is that each data type corresponds to a
label and the labels requested in a query or provided by a participant as data reports
identify the query and the reports. Upon registration, each mobile node receives an
ID corresponding to the type of data of its reports and a token for allowing it to
announce data. Upon query registration, the querier obtains a private decryption key
that corresponds to the ID of the query. Mobile nodes upload to the Service Provider
(SP) their data reports encrypted using the public keys corresponding to their IDs.
Finally, SP blindly matches the encrypted data reports to the encrypted queries. In
this way, only the registered queries for a specific type of data reports can decrypt
and see the information in the reports. The major drawback of this approach is that
all the types of data should be associated with a label. However, if fine-grained
locations are needed, this approach does not provide location privacy as it is easy to
obtain location information from the labels used by the queriers and mobile nodes.
5.2.2.7 Privacy-Preserving Querying
A simple approach for protecting privacy of a querier is to introduce some dummy
query targets along with the real query targets. However, this approach requires
more resources.
The afore-mentioned PEPSI mechanism (De Cristofaro and Soriente 2011) also
provides querier privacy by allowing the querier to encrypt the query. Neither the
Service Provider nor data providers can identify the real identities of the queriers.
A privacy enhancing protocol for participatory sensing (PEPPeR) is proposed
with the aim of protecting privacy of the queriers (Dimitriou et al. 2012). In this
work, queriers directly contact the data providing node and don’t have to trust the
service provider. The querier first obtains a token from the service provider without
revealing its identity. Then it directly contacts the mobile nodes who can answer the
query. The mobile node validates the token and then serves the query. Following
this protocol and by using appropriate cryptographic mechanism, querier’s privacy
is assured and misuse of the tokens is detected.
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5.3 Trust and Reputation
5.3.1 The Problem of Trust
Due to the openness nature of participatory sensing, data with different qualities
can be contributed. It is crucial to the success of the participatory sensing systems
to assess the quality of the reported data and to devise mechanisms that take into
account the quality while analyzing the data. For example, in order to obtain a
more accurate outcome while computing the average value of a phenomenon over a
region, lower weights can be assigned to the data with lower quality. The quality
of a sensor reading can be specified by a value, called trust score, which takes
values in [0, 1]. Trust scores of data reported by a person or device can depend
on the reputation of that person or device and vice versa. This means that, in the
absence of certainty about the match of the reported data to the ground truth, past
behavior of a person captured by her reputation plays an important role in assessing
the trustworthiness of the data.
Trust score of a sensor reading is the level of confidence in how close the reading
is to the (usually unavailable) true value. Trust of a sensing report r, is defined in
Wang et al. (2011) as the probability of r being correct from the perception of the
receiver. Reputation of a person is the opinion of others about the actions of that
person. Reputation of a sensing node is defined in Wang et al. (2011) as a global
value that synthesizes the correctness probability of the past sensing reports made
by the node. Therefore, trust and reputation are two different concepts, even though
they have been used interchangeably.
Several sources of quality distortion can be identified in a typical participatory
sensing system: (1) sensor malfunctioning due to various reasons such as calibration
problems, (2) using low-quality sensors, (3) position of the sensing device that
affects the level of the exposure to the phenomenon, (4) perturbation by privacy
protection mechanisms, and (5) malicious behavior of the participants.
Quality assessment in participatory sensing is a challenging task. This is due to
the lack of access to the ground truth or supporting evidence in many situations
or the subjective view about the desired quality. Reputation systems and trust
assessment have been studied in wireless sensor network domain (e.g., Ganeriwal
et al. 2008; Lim et al. 2010; Yu et al. 2012). However, the unique characteristics
of participatory sensing, such as human involvement, necessitates more adapted
approaches.
5.3.2 Trust Assessment Mechanisms
The existing work in the area of trust and reputation management in participatory
sensing can be classified in three major groups. Reputation-based recruitment
approaches aim for recruiting participants based on their reputation computed from
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their past behavior in order to achieve better results for the campaign. Privacy-aware
trust and reputation management approaches aim at providing frameworks for
assessing trustworthiness of the contributions while protecting participants’ privacy
even though these two goals naturally contradict each other. Privacy-oblivious trust
and reputation management methods provide trust assessment frameworks without
taking into account privacy of the participants. Next, we discuss all three in more
detail.
5.3.2.1 Reputation-Based Recruitment
A recruitment framework for participatory sensing has been proposed that is
composed of three steps: qualification, assessment, and progress review (Reddy
et al. 2010). In the qualification step, the minimum participation requirements such
as availability, transport mode, and reputation identify the candidate participants.
Recruitment is done in the assessment stage where based on some criteria such as
maximizing coverage or minimizing budget, the participants are selected. Finally,
the progress review continually evaluates the reputation and coverage of the
participants to ensure that they are not significantly diverting from their base profile.
The Beta distribution is used to calculate the reputation scores of the participants
which can also incorporate aging factor.
Another reputation framework for participatory sensing is proposed in Yang et al.
(2011). In this framework, reputation is a weighted sum of three factors: (1) direct
reputation, which is calculated based on participant’s past behavior and data report
qualities; (2) personal information, including personal and device capabilities;
and (3) indirect reputation, which includes community and organizer’s trust in
the participant. Based on the quality requirement specifications, participants are
classified in four categories, namely, very trustworthy, trustworthy, untrustworthy,
and very untrustworthy. Depending on the recruiter’s criteria, participants can be
recruited from these categories.
A reputation framework for social participatory sensing is proposed in
Amintoosi and Kanhere (2013). In a social participatory sensing, existing online
social networks are used as the underlying infrastructure and participants can be
identified and recruited based on friendship relations. Only one-hop friends are
selected as participants. The trust scores of the participants are calculated based
on the quality of contributed data and the trust of participants (ToP). ToP consists
of personal factors, such as expertise, timeliness, and locality (being local to
the region of the sensing task), and social factors such as friendship duration and
interaction time. A fuzzy inference system combines these two factors and produces
a trust score for each contribution. Based on these trust scores a reputation score
is calculated for each participant using the PageRank algorithm. This framework is
further extended in Amintoosi and Kanhere (2013) to enable selection of friends of
friends for recruitment and hence to expand the pool of participants.
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5.3.2.2 Privacy-Oblivious Trust and Reputation Management
In the context of sensor networks, a reputation framework for dealing with faulty
sensor readings is proposed in Ganeriwal et al. (2008). The framework consists of
two components, namely a watchdog component and a reputation component. The
watchdog component is responsible for detecting faulty readings based on outlier
detection methods and providing the reputation component with the status of each
reading. The reputation component maintains a reputation score for each sensor
and updates this score based on the input from the watchdog component. Based
on this approach, a reputation system for participatory sensing has been proposed
(Huang et al. 2010). The space and time are divided into grids and the redundancy
in each grid is used in the watchdog component to calculate a cooperative rating
for each reading using an outlier detection algorithm. The cooperative ratings in
the current epoch are then fed to the reputation component, which also uses the
past cooperative ratings of the sensors to update their reputation scores. Reputation
scores are computed using the Gompertz function that satisfies gradual trust build
up for honest behavior and rapid trust tear down for untrustworthy behavior.
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) hardware can be used to ensure that the data
reported by the mobile node is indeed the data that is measured by the sensor (Dua
et al. 2009). However, this assurance does not always satisfy trust requirements
and also it can threaten privacy of the users. Moreover, this technique does not
prevent malicious or inadvertent behavior. For example, the user can put the
sensing device in a place where the phenomenon cannot be correctly measured
(e.g., putting the temperature sensor in the fridge). In many applications sending
trusted raw data to the server is expensive in terms of resources. For instance,
sending raw sound and video consumes too much bandwidth and one should
process them before transmission to reduce their size. Therefore mechanisms are
needed to ensure trustworthiness of the data not only after sensing but also after
processing and transformation by third party applications (Gilbert et al. 2010).
For protecting privacy of users, two platform features are provided in Gilbert
et al. (2010): (1) preventing applications from accessing local resources without
authorization; and (2) monitoring applications for making sure they do not release
private information.
5.3.2.3 Privacy-Aware Trust and Reputation Management
A drawback of approaches such as the ones presented by Huang et al. (2010)
is that for computing reputation scores, the history of user behavior is required.
However, in a system that uses pseudonyms for protecting privacy of users, different
contributions of a user cannot be linked together. A trusted third party that performs
anonymization can be used to compute reputation scores (Huang et al. 2012), since
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this entity knows the real identity behind the pseudonyms. Yet, naively transferring
reputation information to the applications can inadvertently help an adversary to link
the reputation information to the anonymized users. In order to avoid this threat,
(Huang et al. 2012) uses a k-anonymity scheme that ensures that at least k users
have the same reputation scores at the same time. Christin et al. (2013) further
enhances the robustness of the privacy-aware reputation mechanism, by allowing the
users to periodically change their pseudonyms and apply blind signatures (Chaum
1983) to prevent linking pseudonyms by the reputation and pseudonym manager
(corresponding to the trusted third party in Huang et al. (2012)). In order to reduce
the risk of inferring the true identities while reputation scores are transferred from
the current pseudonym to the next one, users cloak their reputation score. In this
way, users can achieve more anonymity protection at the cost of reducing their
reputation.
Blind signature mechanism is also used in Wang et al. (2013) for enabling anony-
mous reputation. This framework consists of three components: provenance model,
sensing report trust assessment, and anonymous reputation management. Prove-
nance is the meta-data that describes the origin of the data and is composed of user
provenance and contextual provenance. User provenance contains the pseudonym
and the certified reputation level of the user, while contextual provenance includes
the sensing environment factors such as time, location, traveling mode, and sensing
mode (e.g., text, image, video). Trust of a sensing report is calculated considering
the reputation level of the user, and the contextual provenance of the report, as well
as the similarity to the other existing reports for the same task. Similarly to Christin
et al. (2013), the blind signature mechanism is used to update the reputation level of
users, based on the feedback from sensing report trust calculation, without the need
to reveal their actual identity.
Collaborative path hiding is an approach for protecting location privacy of
participants, in which participants exchange their reports upon meeting each other
and then they submit the exchanged reports. Consequently, the application server
cannot link the reports to the reporter. TrustMeter is a scheme proposed to evaluate
the degree of collaboration and also to identify malicious users (Christin et al. 2012).
Users give feedback about each other, to the application server, without revealing
any private information about the peers, regarding how many of the exchanged
reports have been transmitted by the peers.
In a participatory sensing setting where participants ask the server for the closest
data collection points to them, the problem of location privacy and trust in collected
data is slightly different. A privacy protection mechanism called PiRi is proposed in
Kazemi and Shahabi (2011) for this setting. In order to ensure trustworthiness of the
contributed data while using PiRi as the privacy protection mechanism, a solution
has been proposed based on redundant allocation of data collection point to users
assuming that the majority of users are truthful (Kazemi and Shahabi 2012).
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5.4 Participatory Incentives
5.4.1 The Question of Incentives
Distributed systems, in which participants/nodes interact freely without any cen-
tralized authority require robust incentives to ensure contribution. Since crowdsens-
ing/participatory sensing systems are also not owned by anyone in particular, they
too require the provision of social and economic incentives for participants. In the
last Chapter, the question of incentives was briefly touched upon, limited to the
provision of incentives for users to do high quality work. However, the provision
of incentives can be used to achieve a host of goals, including incentives for
adherence to the protocol; abstention from malicious activities; and contribution of
resources. Furthermore, most existing incentive schemes do not depend on financial
rewards, due to the problems identified in the previous chapter (Motivating workers
in crowdsourcing markets) plus some additional issues that we explicate next.
The design of such incentive schemes could be guided by various approaches,
including mechanism design, heterodox economics, and other socially inspired
mechanisms.
Usually, incentive schemes are developed with a particular model of user-
behavior in the background, which is the rational model. We first concentrate on
such works because they are pre-dominant in the literature.
Certain works bring up the conflict between fairness and social welfare. Fairness
can be loosely defined as the provision of best quality or highest utility to the
participant who contributes the most. Social Welfare is described as the increase
in the overall utility of all users.
LiveCompare is a system that allows participants to hunt for bargains in grocery
shopping via participatory sensing using mobile phone cameras (Deng and Cox
2009). It uses barcode decoding for the automatic identification of grocery products,
and also localization techniques for accurately spotting store locations.
In order to incentivize users to contribute, it uses a very clever incentive
mechanism, which is built into the user’s query for services. When a user goes to a
grocery store and wants to compare prices of particular items in other grocery stores,
she submits her query by taking a photograph of the item in question. This includes
the unique UPC barcode. The location of the store is also sent as part of the query.
So the server is able to enrich its database with pricing and location information of
the particular product; information that other participants can later make use of.
A purely game-theoretical approach for incentivizing people to contribute in
participatory sensing has been proposed (Luo and Tham 2012). Using a rational
actor model, the system links users demands to their contributions, i.e., quality of
service for particular demand is related to users contributions. Two approaches are
considered: one which focuses on ensuring fairness, as in providing best service to
the highest contributors; and the second approach which ensures maximum social
welfare. It is proved that the solution is a Nash Equilibrium.
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SenseUtil is a system in which consumers have to pay producers to carry out sens-
ing jobs (Thepvilojanapong et al. 2013). Using principles from microeconomics, the
sensed data is valued by supply and demand. Demand and supply depend on factors
such as location, user’s preference, type of data required, etc.
An auction mechanism for incentivizing participation has also been presented
(Jaimes et al. 2012). Similarly, monetary incentives in order to increase users
participation have been put forward (Krontiris and Albers 2012). It is noted that
providing monetary incentives is problematic because it is hard to determine the
price at which users would want to sell their data. In order to solve this problem, a
reverse auction mechanism to determine the value of sensed data is introduced. The
novel point in this approach is that the auction is multi-attributive to accommodate
the fact that different sensing data could be of different quality. The proposal helps
users select and buy the highest quality sensed data (thus implicitly providing
incentives for all data providers to improve their quality).
A credit based scheme in which users earn credit by contributing data has also
been employed to offer incentives (Li and Cao 2013). The system uses a ‘Trusted
Third Party’ to ensure that contributed data is not revealed, and privacy is protected.
In order to stimulate user participation, Reverse Auction based Dynamic Price
(RADP) uses a bidding system where users can sell their sensing data to a service
provider (Lee and Hoh 2010). The system uses the rational user model. The aim
is to minimize the cost while incentivizing users to remain in, and not drop out of,
participatory sensing applications.
An incentive scheme has also been proposed for road traffic prediction system
based on participatory sensing (Lan and Wang 2013). It employs a credit based
scheme earlier used in other participatory systems as well (Mawji and Hassanein
2008). Users earn virtual credits when they upload their data, and when they want
to avail the service i.e., they want to know the future traffic condition, they have to
spend credits.
The above works relied on a rational use model and/or purely game-theoretic
approaches. However, it is likely that users that take part in participatory com-
munities have unequal resources and also exhibit different behavior. Borrowing
from Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), we can assume that user behavior can simply
reflect standard operating procedures, rules of thumb, instincts, habits, or imitation,
etc. Furthermore, for a tractable analysis of complex behavior, a game-theoretic
approach requires a high level of abstraction of the design space. It follows that
different designers can choose different abstractions to reach equally valid but
different (sometimes contradictory) results. Thus, it is worthwhile to model a wide
variety of user behavior and study the effects of different models on the underlying
incentive scheme. Agent based modeling (or simulation-based) approaches can aid
designers in complementing game-theoretic approaches to explore the design space
of behavioral space more comprehensively.
In line with this thinking, NoiseMap, a participatory sensing application used to
accurately measure noise levels, proposes different kinds of incentive schemes to
motivate user participation (Schweizer et al. 2012). In this mechanism, External
Incentives work by showing users each others performance via ranking. The
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basic idea behind this is that competition with, and emulation of, others is a big
psychological motivator for human beings. Therefore, if each user could see her
performance rank in the global rankings, she could be incentivized to perform better.
The ranking is available as daily, weekly, monthly and total, giving new users a
chance to claim top spots fast. This is an example of gamification and can make the
users feel excited and happy.
Furthermore, an Internal Incentives scheme has also been proposed, which
allows users to get complete feedback on their measurement history including
number of measurements taken, time spent with the application etc. There is also
a scale reflecting at what time the application is used. By looking at their history
users can evaluate the time and effort put into NoiseMap and set new goals for
themselves.
‘Top of the Worlds’ is another incentive scheme not based on the rational model,
which seeks to improve motivation to participate in sensing services by showing
rankings in multidimensional hierarchical sets (Kawasaki et al. 2012). It is noted
that previously proposed methods only rank a user among all other users, and this
means that many people have little chance of being ranked in the top group, resulting
in little motivation to continue. ‘Top of Worlds’ creates many sets with varying
granularity to increase the chance of many users being ranked high. Subsequently,
these rankings are presented to the users to incentivize more participation.
5.4.2 Empirical Observations
While the above are models that need to be implemented to see what effects they
might have, some researchers have carried out projects in the field to explore the
incentivizing models and choices that can make an impact on people’s behavior.
For instance, Reddy et al. carried out a project to learn more about sustainability
practices at a university (Reddy et al. 2010). Study campaigns documenting use
of various resources were carried out. Their findings include: (a) participants
desired mobile visualizations to motivate them to participate more effectively;
(b) participants were willing to accommodate minor diversions to their daily
routines to help with the data collection campaign. However, they stated that drastic
changes would require extra incentives; and (c) finally, participants felt that daily
contribution summaries and reminders would foster increased participation.
In another work by the same authors, micro-payment system as an incentive
model in an actual case study is analyzed (Reddy et al. 2010). Their findings
include: (a) monetary incentives were more beneficial when combined with other
motivating factors such as altruism or competitiveness (self or with others); and
(b) micro-payments based on competition might be better suited for short bursty data
collections unless mechanisms are added to offset participant fatigue. Making the
incentive payment fair for all participants was important—very low baseline micro-
payments discouraged individuals even when the potential to earn money existed.
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Also, if properly designed, micro-payments have the potential to extend participant
coverage both spatially and temporally.
5.5 Discussion
In this Chapter, we studied the major economic and social challenges faced by
open distributed systems, such as Participatory Sensing systems. These are primarily
related to Privacy and Trust on the social front, and provision of Incentives on the
economic front. We have reviewed the state of the art techniques that have been
proposed to address these challenges.
In this section, we will discuss three key challenges that the research community
needs to address for designing successful participatory sensing systems.
5.5.1 Trusted Third Parties: Can They Be Eliminated?
A major differentiating factor in existing participatory sensing system architectures
is the presence (or lack thereof) of one or more components that are fully trusted by
the participants.
AnonySense (discussed in Sect. 5.2.2) architecture includes two components that
are assumed to be trusted by mobile nodes, namely the Registration Authority and
the Anonymization Service. A trusted third party, which is called Anonymization
Server (AS), is assumed to be present for creating equivalent classes in Huang et al.
(2010). However, the authors propose a location perturbation approach to relax the
assumption of full trust in AS. Anonygator uses a trusted entity called the bank for
accounting and preventing malicious users from injecting disproportionate amount
of false data (Puttaswamy et al. 2010). In addition, a P2P communication is assumed
among participants.
PoolView does not assume the existence of any trusted third party (Ganti et al.
2008). The implication of this assumption and the approach proposed based on
that, is that only aggregate community trends can be measured—not the actual
value of the phenomenon sensed by the community. PEPSI (De Cristofaro and
Soriente 2011) proposes a more realistic architecture composed of mobile nodes,
queriers, network operator that provides GSM or 3G, registration authority, and
service provider. No trusted third party is considered in the architecture. However,
registration authority is an entity that has to be trusted for providing authorization
and certificates. Hu and Shahabi (2010) proposes a node to node communication in
a social network structure created by friendship relations among users. Therefore,
no trusted third party is needed. However, for security and integrity purposes, an
entity is required to issue certifications. Kazemi and Shahabi (2011) assumes P2P
communication among users (collaboration) and therefore, the need for a trusted
third party is eliminated. Another proposal suggests using cloud-based agents for
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mobile nodes to eliminate the need of a trusted entity and the P2P communication
among mobile nodes, which is not always possible (Krontiris and Dimitriou 2013).
It can be concluded that in all the works mentioned above, regardless of the
architecture, some sort of trust between entities has to be present. However, the
P2P communication among users does not seem realistic. The reason is that
most of the existing participatory sensing systems rely on participants carrying
smartphones with Internet connectivity provided by their network operator (3G or
GSM). Moreover, it is not a realistic assumption that the participants always have
access to wireless access points or other network media. Finally, it is not clear if
smartphone users are open to directly communicate with other users because of the
lack of trust.
5.5.2 Interdependency Among Trust, Privacy, and Incentives
Privacy and trust are for all practical purposes contradictory to each other. Generally
speaking, data providers use obfuscation as a defensive mechanism for protecting
their privacy. However, as the level of obfuscation increases, the consumer’s trust in
the provider decreases. Moreover, certain types of obfuscation can even render the
reported data completely useless for the consumer. Drawing a boundary between
defensive action and deceptive action therefore becomes nontrivial. If it is beneficial,
a provider might be willing to reduce her level of obfuscation in order to gain more
trust of the consumer. In other words, providers trade the privacy in return for some
benefit. Therefore, for increasing the utility of participatory sensing systems, it is
essential to provide effective mechanisms that enable privacy-trust negotiations.
It is worthwhile noting that the success of most of the mechanisms mentioned
in Sect. 5.3.2 depends on the existence of enough redundant participants. Without
this requirement it is rather straightforward for an adversary to link the reports or
the reputation transfers to corresponding participants. This stresses the need for
recruiting as many participants as possible to contribute enough and useful data
and for guaranteeing their privacy protection and finally an efficient data analysis
based on reputation of the participants and trust scores of the contributed data. For
achieving this, effective incentive mechanisms must be employed to engage a large
number of participants.
5.5.3 The Need for Diverse Incentive Models
Incentive mechanisms usually rely on either the rational user model inherited from
mainstream economics or they try to take inspiration from other fields such as
psychology and the social sciences in general. We showed that engineers and
researchers in participatory systems, utilize various types of user-models in their
works. In our view, it is clear that while some scenarios necessitate the usage of
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a rational actor model, often this model proves to be limited and fails to provide
adequate incentive to much of the ‘population’: those who are not well-equipped
to contribute highly or those who don’t respond to such incentives. Therefore, it is
needed to properly explore other facets such as psychological considerations, e.g.,
peer imitation, feel-good factor, simple heuristics etc, that people in participatory
systems (may) use.
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